INTRODUCTION
Some scholars have seen the Aristotelian natural philosopher Giacomo Zabarella (1533-89) as a precursor of Galileo, indeed of modern scientifi c method. 1 Others have insisted that Zabarella's logical methodology never foreshadowed the Galilean "two new sciences", let alone modern scientifi c method. 2 Both views, regardless of their merits in stirring a healthy historiographic debate, have tended to emphasize the signifi cance of Zabarella's methodological works, and his role in the history of Renaissance philosophy. An insight by Charles Schmitt, according to which ultimately "Zabarella's primary motive was to understand, explicate, and substantiate the philosophy of Aristotle", has inspired the present research. 3 As Schmitt and many others have recognized, Zabarella is a fascinating fi gure for historians of early modern developments in natural science and philosophy. Indeed Schmitt's most erudite study on the different roles of experience in Galileo and Zabarella speaks volumes about this fascination. 4 In this paper, my objective is to contribute to the project of re-appraisal of Zabarella, interrupted by Schmitt's premature death. More specifi cally, I will argue that, in his practice of natural science, Zabarella achieved a lucid separation between allegiance to reason and allegiance to Aristotle's authority, within the constraints of the Aristotelian framework. Zabarella, in other words, fully realized that he could freely practise natural science [scientia naturalis] according to Aristotle's mind [ad mentem Aristotelis], suspending the question of whether Aristotle's pronouncements could be reconciled with the truth of the matter.
In the remainder of this section, I will introduce Zabarella's practice of scientia naturalis in relation to the constraint of allegiance to authority, and touch on some fundamental themes that will be developed in the course of the paper. In Section 2, I will survey Zabarella's forms of allegiance to the authority of Aristotle in De rebus naturalibus. In Section 3, I will analyse Zabarella's De rebus naturalibus with the help of examples that illustrate the separation between allegiance to reason and allegiance to Aristotle's authority. In Section 4, I will draw some historiographic conclusions.
What was Zabarella's practice of scientia naturalis? By scientia naturalis, I mean natural science as it was intended by Zabarella himself. It is crucial that we read Zabarella's defi nition of the subject of scientia naturalis in its own original language.
… in hac tempestate videntur omnes in hac sententia convenisse, quod corpus universe sumptum, quod et coelestia et inferiora omnia complectatur, quatenus
naturale, hoc est, quatenus habens in se ipso naturam, quae motus principium esse defi nitur, sit commune subiectum totius scientiae naturalis. 5 … in our time everybody seems to have agreed on this opinion, that body, in its broadest meaning, i.e., such that it comprises all things both celestial and sublunary, in so far as it is natural, that is, in so far as it has in itself a nature which is defi ned as a principle of motion, is the general subject of all natural science.
Thus the subject of scientia naturalis is natural body in its broadest possible sense [universe sumptum], celestial and sublunary. But Zabarella's practice of scientia naturalis was not the culmination of a form of "experimentally grounded and mathematically formulated" inquiry into natural body, according to J. H. Randall's vision of long-standing, "cooperative efforts" in the schools of Padua and northern Italy, starting in the "thirteenth-and fourteenth-centuries", where "there had been worked out the idea of an experimentally grounded and mathematically formulated science of nature". 6 On the contrary, Zabarella's practice of scientia naturalis conformed to a well-regulated set of teaching practices constrained by multiple sources of authority. The production of scientifi c texts was related to the teaching activities, and the texts were usually the basis of a professor's lectures on natural science in the faculties of arts. Sometimes the texts took the polished form of printed textbooks. Sometimes, indeed often, they lived in the more ephemeral space of oral communication within the classroom. To the latter phenomenon the immense manuscript heritage, mostly lecture notes, still surviving in European libraries, bears witness. 7 I label the living participants in the teaching practices scientiae traditores, teachers and/or deliverers of science. That teaching scientia naturalis was constrained by multiple sources of authority, i.e., authores, was recognized by Pietro Ragnisco, more than a century ago. 8 In my view nothing in subsequent, relevant scholarship calls into question Ragnisco's insight. Authores, that is, authorities, can be both past and contemporary ones. When quoted and discussed by another participant in the teaching practices, any traditor becomes an author. This duality of teaching and authority has so far been missed in the literature. Authores can be virtually enlisted into the teaching community, regardless of their belonging to a profoundly different, past cultural setting. 9 This diachronic dimension of authority is essential in all respects, I think. Traditores do not speak for themselves only. They take responsibility before a whole tradition, which they constantly re-generate, as more and more authores become available in the marketplace. In the texts, authores are always worthy of being quoted, discussed, accepted, or quite possibly, and quite often, refuted.
It is because of this diachronic dimension of authority that traditores such as Zabarella, or Cesare Cremonini (1550-1631), in Padua, and, for example, the Jesuit professors of the Collegium Romanumauthority: (a) the corpus of Aristotelian writings circulating in the Renaissance (an object of emotional value 13 ), (b) reason (to be further qualifi ed in what follows), and (c) a whole host of authores. Zabarella and his fellow traditores must respond to many authores. The articulated summaries/discussions of opinions of authores, which historians of medieval and Renaissance thought are so familiar with, bear witness to the uniformity and consistency of this process. In the texts of Zabarella and his fellow traditores we discern a sense of responsibility to respond to multiple authorities, back to Aristotle, the author/authority par excellence.
Zabarella's practice, the details of which we shall see in Section 3, consists in mobilizing his allegiance to these multiple authorities, in such a way that reason and Aristotle are set free to compete with each other, though under the constraint that they must always be reconcilable. 14 Thus, since I have considered this diligently, and have always believed that, fi rst of all, the truth of the matter is to be investigated, and afterwards, once that has become known, Aristotle's words should, if possible, be reconciled with it, not the other way round, which many do.… To the truth of the matter Zabarella will conform his interpretation of Aristotle's words as far as possible. It is Aristotle's writings that have to be accommodated to the truth of the matter, not the other way round. Note, however, that although one cannot simply do away with Aristotle's texts, if they seem to be at variance with the truth of the matter, Zabarella boldly asserts that, once the truth has become known, Aristotle's words should be reconciled with the truth, "if possible" ["si fi eri posset"], as the above quotation indicates. Indeed, we shall see that Zabarella recognizes that this reconciliation is not always possible (cf. Section 3). Thus, an original space is created in which allegiance to Aristotle does not preclude independent reasoning. 16 Let me clarify my use of 'independent'. It all depends on what we mean by 'independence'. Think of Pythagoras's theorem, and the postulates and common notions of Euclidean geometry. You may need all of them to produce the proof of Pythagoras's theorem, and in this sense you are not independent of Euclidean postulates and common notions. Still, it takes a lot of originality to come up with the proof, which is actually quite complex. Would you deny any originality to the mathematician who discovered the Euclidean proof of Pythagoras's theorem? I think not. In the rest of the paper, I hope, it will become clearer what the limits of, and constraints on, this independence are, and why, in the case of Zabarella, this constrained independence is highly original.
We shall see that when, for example, investigating the physics of gravitas and levitas, or the status of species intelligibiles, Zabarella is above all concerned with clarifying, articulating, and defending Aristotle's pronouncements. But a change in attitude occurs when Zabarella reaches the very limits beyond which (for him) scientia naturalis trespasses into the terrain of metaphysics, i.e., for instance, when tackling the question of the eternal mover, discussed by Aristotle in the last book of the Physics. Then, the Paduan professor launches into a naturalization, i.e., a reduction to principles of natural philosophy and, as we shall see, specifi c logical methods, of Aristotle's own demonstration of the eternal mover. He believes that, in this way, Aristotle, qua natural philosopher, will not be accused of trespassing beyond the limits of natural philosophy.
This attempt at separating the jurisdiction of the natural philosopher, pursuing scientia naturalis, from that of the metaphysician is worth exploring in further detail, although we need to keep in mind that Zabarella never wrote a commentary on Aristotle's metaphysics, an unfortunate lacuna for us. Two important and similar documents survive in which Zabarella expands on the role of the teacher in relation to natural science. The fi rst is an oratio read by Zabarella in 1585. The second is a "preliminary discourse" to a course on Aristotle's Physics, Book VIII, which had only recently been published. 17 The main thrust of both writings concerns the specifi c methodology that, according to Zabarella, Aristotle follows in building scientia naturalis, and the implications of this fact for the expositors; in other words, what it means for a teacher "to philosophize in an Aristotelian fashion" ["aristotelice philosophari"]. For Aristotle is to be considered, says Zabarella, the inventor of "scientifi c methods" ["scientifi carum methodorum"]. 18 This scientifi c methodology, Zabarella argues, is particularly evident in the case of Aristotle's Physics, Book VIII. 19 Two precepts must be observed in order for the philosopher/teacher to proceed correctly. One is the convenient order that must be followed, the other, more important for our purposes here, is the way of philosophizing that Aristotle taught us in the Posterior analytics. To illuminate this point further, Zabarella suggests a fascinating analogy with mathematics. Scientia naturalis is built as a succession of theorems [theoremata] . The way of constructing these theorems is the logic of the so-called potissimae demonstrationes [most perfect demonstrations]. (In the fi nal section of this paper, I will come back to this question of potissima demonstratio with further details.) These potissimae demonstrationes are to be found, Zabarella continues, especially in Aristotle's Physics, Book VIII. Thus, Zabarella sees in the logical methodology of the Posterior analytics the essence of scientifi c methodology. It is this scientifi c methodology focused on potissima demonstratio that qualifi es the separation of the natural philosopher's activity of constructing theoremata in scientia naturalis from that of the metaphysician, hence of the theologian. The latter, Zabarella says, starts from wholly different principles, which only Christian doctrine teaches us to be the true ones. As we shall see in more detail in Section 3, the metaphysician can take the natural philosopher's conclusions as givens, and, for instance, investigate the conditions of the eternal movers, so as to arrive at knowledge of what the eternal movers really are (i.e., knowledge of their essences). But this is not scientia constructed on theoremata by means of potissimae demonstrationes.
Finally, we shall see that when up against one of the most problematic (in his view) of Aristotle's statements about the nature of celestial heat [calor coelestis], Zabarella eventually reaches the threshold, without crossing it, of a withdrawal of allegiance.
Strategies of allegiance, then, or intellectual brinkmanship, play an important role in Zabarella's scientifi c practice. In the remainder of this paper, I will narrow my focus on Zabarella's scientia naturalis in the light of his mobile allegiance to authorities.
ALLEGIANCE IN DE REBUS NATURALIBUS
In De rebus naturalibus Zabarella collected a number of essays on questions that were current among Aristotelian commentators in his time, as the subtitle indicates. 20 The book is composed of twenty-four tracts. The De rebus naturalibus, as a whole, has received little attention so far, since scholarly interest has tended to focus on Zabarella's logical writings. 21 In De rebus naturalibus, we fi nd Zabarella constantly manoeuvring to relate his investigations on natural science to the various sources of authority that I have mentioned in the introduction, namely, (a) the corpus of Aristotelian writings circulating in the Renaissance, (b) reason, and (c) a host of authores.
An illuminating comment by Charles Lohr will serve as the starting point of my discussion of the patterns of promissory obligations undertaken by Zabarella in De rebus.
Because the formulation of an independent philosophy dealing with God, the world, and man sub ratione entis relieved Scholastic thinkers of the obligation to relate their conclusions to Aristotelian principles, we must distinguish sixteenthcentury Scholastic Aristotelianism both from its Medieval predecessor and from the secular Aristotelianism in the arts faculties of the Italian universities. Whereas the Italian Aristotelians were reduced to offering simply an exegesis of the Philosopher's text.… 22 I shall try to moderate Lohr's negative conclusion concerning Italian secular Aristotelianism. Does Zabarella really fi t Lohr's view?
To answer this question I will quote some relevant excerpts from De rebus tracts, where Zabarella states clearly its objectives. This will allow us to discern the promissory obligations that Zabarella puts himself under at the opening of each single tract. These promissory obligations will show that Zabarella does not offer simply an exegesis of the Philosopher's text.
In Tracts 2, 3, 4, 7, 13, 20, 21 and 22, we fi nd an explicit promise of allegiance to Aristotle's opinion, which supports Lohr's conclusion, to the effect that Zabarella qualifi es his practice as being simply that of clarifying, declaring, and/or interpreting Aristotle. 23 A typical example is as follows. Zabarella says: "… I thought I would do a good thing if I tried with all my force to explicate the diffi cult questions concerning this subject [i.e., prime matter] that cause problems to everybody; and, if, by making public the things which I had excogitated while philosophizing, and setting aside others, I could get closer to the truth, and, if possible, to making Aristotle's opinion on prime matter clearer." 24 However, in Tract 1, we fi nd an original illustration of the whole fabrica of natural science, presented as an introduction to the subsequent tracts. 25 … not to mention others, not only did Pietro Pomponazzi, who very well and most diligently disputed about accretion in two published books, openly confess that he could not fi nd an explanation [of accretion], but he dared to assert that no human could possibly claim that he had an explanation of this thing. Thus, considering all of this, and being compelled by the example and authority of that man, whose judgement I esteem the most, I decided neither to avoid this disputation because of its diffi culty, which would have been unworthy of a philosopher, nor to write about it under the delusion that I could attain the whole truth about this, and a perfect exposition, which would have been arrogant and a sign of temerity. Thus, I will strive as much as possible to get close to the truth, and even if I cannot attain it, at least I will have excited others to undertake this investigation…. 28 Here is another example of Zabarella's intent ad mentem Aristotelis. Zabarella says: "We will thus follow this order in our disputation: we will consider what must be thought, according to Aristotle's mind, fi rst of all about the whole soul according to its substance, second of all about the whole soul according to its quantity and extension, and fi nally about the whole soul according to its faculties." 29 The expressions iuxta Aristotelis mentem and ad mentem Aristotelis mean "according to Aristotle's mind"; and de facto, when we look at what Zabarella does, they mean according to the principles of Aristotle's natural science. These are rather common expressions in this sort of literature, but also elsewhere. For example, in the manuscript sheets left by Vincenzo Viviani, Galileo's fi rst biographer and pupil, preserved in the Galileo collection at Florence, we fi nd occurrences of the phrase ad mentem Galilaei, typically when Viviani is reconstructing Galileo's ideas, in order to answer new questions, and/or clarify questions dealt with by Galileo himself, starting from Galileo's own principles, as expounded in the Two new sciences. 30 Finally, in Tracts 9, 11, 14, 16 and 24, Zabarella declares that he will consider, or clarify, or dispute on, or simply talk about, the corresponding subject matter. 31 A typical example is as follows. Zabarella says: "It is so manifest that celestial bodies produce heat in this inferior region, which does not seem to be in need of proof: but doubt arises as to the mode and cause [of this]. … we set ourselves the task of talking about only the heat produced by celestial [bodies]; thus the question we must consider now is in which way they do this, not being hot." 32 Thus we observe three types of promise of allegiance in De rebus naturalibus. First, we fi nd an explicit pledge that Zabarella's main objective is simply to explain Aristotle's view. In this regard, the corpus of Aristotelian writings circulating in the Renaissance, above all the commentaries by Averroes, is generally authoritative. I call this the commentator allegiance. This is the form that submission to the authority of traditio takes in Zabarella. Second, we fi nd a promise to accede to the truth by himself in accord with Aristotle's mind. This is the form that submission to the authority of reason takes in Zabarella. I call this the scientist allegiance. Third, we fi nd a much less committal attitude to authority, which may indicate that Zabarella had some diffi culties in categorizing his own approach, and which, for example, in Tract 11, De mistione, takes the form of a defence of Averroes's views applied to the question at issue. However, the third type can be reduced to the scientist allegiance, by looking at the conclusions reached by Zabarella in De naturalis scientiae constitutione, the opening tract of De rebus. There Zabarella crafts a revealing simile between geometry and natural science, which articulates well what Zabarella's practice of scientia ad mentem Aristotelis ultimately consists in.
The last section of the tract is entitled De perfectione scientiae naturalis ac de eius ordine. It remains to be asked, Zabarella says, whether "perfectam rerum naturalium scientiam ab Aristotele traditam esse", i.e., "if natural science has been taught, or delivered, perfect by Aristotle". 33 To which Zabarella answers that Aristotle's natural science can be said to be both perfect and imperfect. As to its fabric and artifi cium it can be said to be perfect. As to its matter and the number of things considered it can be said to be imperfect. For there are many things that remained unknown to Aristotle. But in order to attain knowledge [notitia] of these things, it would not be necessary to teach, or deliver, a natural science [non … tradere naturalem scientiam oporteret] with a different order or artifi cium. In fact both order and artifi cium would remain the same. Thus, Zabarella concludes, it can be said that Aristotle's books on natural science play the same role as that played by Euclid's Elements in mathematics. Mathematicians know very well, he continues, that all new theorems can be derived from those in the Elements, and this is why Euclid called his books elements. All new theorems are contained in the Elements at least virtually, or potentially. By the same token, in Zabarella's analysis, all natural science can be derived from Aristotle's natural books. In this sense natural science is perfect, at least virtually, or potentially. 34 If you learn how to philosophize ad mentem Aristotelis, Zabarella seems to say, you will be able to reconstruct the whole of natural science from Aristotle's natural books.
To sum up, I suggest that we need to distinguish only between two modalities of relation to authority, according to the type of promise of allegiance marking the opening of each essay, i.e., the commentator and scientist types of allegiance. It is in the intellectual space opened up by the tension between these two forms of obligation that we must look for Zabarella's originality.
SCIENTIA NATURALIS IN DE REBUS NATURALIBUS
In this section, I articulate the discussion of the relation between allegiance and natural science ad mentem Aristotelis with a progression of four examples, the last of which will show Zabarella unequivocally approaching a withdrawal of allegiance to Aristotle.
Example 1. The theory of motion of heavy and light bodies.
In De motu gravium et levium, Zabarella says, he will limit himself to clarifying the opinions of Aristotle, which have given rise to so many controversies. This does not sound promising if one is interested in knowing whether Zabarella has anything original to say about the essay's topic. Indeed throughout the essay Zabarella defends Aristotle on a number of counts. However, this is not the whole story. In fact, there are at least two strong elements of originality in Zabarella's essay, where we can observe the scientist working ad mentem Aristotelis. The fi rst concerns the motion of projectiles, the second concerns the theory of natural place.
The motion of projectiles. At the very end of the fi rst Book of the essay, whose subject is the motion of the four pure elements, Zabarella ventures into an explanation of the cause of acceleration in free fall. He mounts his explanation on the basis of Aristotle's theory of the motion of projectiles. The objective is to show that Aristotle is right when saying that the cause of acceleration is simply the greater gravity of the falling body. But in what sense does the gravity of the falling body increase, Zabarella asks himself? To answer this question he has an ingenious argument based on an analogy with air's peristaltic action on projectiles. 35 First, however, Zabarella responds to a number of authorities. Hipparchus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Simplicius, Thomas Aquinas, and Durandus de Sancto Porciano, are all extensively quoted and refuted. 36 But Durandus is the one whose opinion is closest to the truth, Zabarella thinks. The smaller resistance of the medium, he acknowledges, is in fact responsible for the acceleration of falling elements. Durandus does not furnish a cause of this diminished resistance, however. The cause can be discovered by thinking about what Aristotle teaches when attributing the cause of the motion of projectiles to the parts of the surrounding air. It is true that Aristotle's theory concerns violent motion, but, in Zabarella's view, it can be applied also to natural motion. The percussion of the orderly parts of air by the hand throwing the projectile sets them in motion, after which they in turn keep pushing the projectile, though less and less until their action dies out. By the same token, Zabarella says, if the air's action described by Aristotle for violent motion is true, it must also be true for natural motion. In the case of the descending heavy element, the motor, the nature of the heavy element, is constantly attached to it. Thus if no other cause intervenes a heavy element should fall at a constant speed. Yet it accelerates. Why? Because, Zabarella answers, the underlying parts of air are pushed and set in motion by the descending heavy element itself, which therefore will be less and less impeded by them as they are already in motion.
Finally, why does Aristotle claim that the cause of a falling body's acceleration is decreasing gravity? Gravity, Zabarella argues, can be taken in two senses. In one sense it is a propensity [propensio] to a low place. In another sense it can be said to be gravitatio, and it is no more than the excess of the virtus motrix over the resistance of the medium. It is in this sense that Aristotle's claim has to be intended, and in this sense, Zabarella concludes, it is correct. 38 The theory of natural place. A step forward is now taken by Zabarella. So far he has been concerned with pure elements. But in fact we commonly experience mixed bodies all around us in the sublunary universe. Thus, Zabarella claims, the question of the motor of heavy and light bodies must be reformulated in terms of the motor of mixed bodies. I will not follow Zabarella as he argues against a number of authores, and their interpretations of the mixed motor. All I need is his personal opinion ad mentem Aristotelis. Each mixed body will have to move according to the dominant element present in the mixture, says Zabarella. Since there is in each mixture a dominant element, each mixture has a form of its own, so that one specifi c natural place in the sublunary universe will have to be assigned to each mixture. This will be done in accordance with the proportion of gravity and levity present in the mixture, determined by the dominant element, so that all mixtures, as well as the four pure elements, will have a defi nite place at a certain distance from the centre, or from the heaven, according to this proportion. Thus when a mixed body is located outside of the place assigned to it, it will naturally tend to that place. Here is an example. When we see oil fl oating on water this does not happen because oil will sometime move downwards as when in air, and sometimes upwards as when in water. In fact the nature of oil is unique. Oil fl oats on the surface of water because that is the natural place for oil to be, for its nature to be preserved. The natural place of oil is in between those of water and air. Zabarella concludes as follows: "There is no difference in this between the elements and the mixed bodies, insofar as they are heavy and light. To each of them a natural place is assigned in the universe, towards which bodies move from all other places, and this is located at a longer or shorter distance from the centre, or from the heaven, according to the [body's] proportion of gravity and levity." 39 There can be infi nitely many mixed bodies according as the proportion of heaviness and lightness in the mixture can be infi nitely varied. Correlatively there will be infi nitely many natural places in the sublunary universe according to the distance from the centre (or from the heaven) of the spherical shell assigned to each mixture. Zabarella's sublunary universe is like an infi nitely stratifi ed onion, a fi nely grained universe, a layer for each mixture's natural place. Scientia ad mentem Aristotelis, Zabarella avows, though, I submit, quite a jump from the cosmology of De caelo.
Example 2. The status of 'species intelligibiles'.
40 Under the guise of an elaborate response to authority, whose ultimate objective is the defence of Aristotle's opinion on species intelligibiles, Zabarella the scientist puts forward his views according to the principles of Aristotle's philosophy [secundum principia philosophiae Aristotelis].
In Zabarella's words, Aristotle's opinion is that "the intellect is totally unmixed, it does not have any intelligible [species] within itself in actuality, but has all of them potentially, which it receives from external objects". 41 Zabarella's response to the authorities, whose meanderings we cannot follow here, shows many elements that cannot be found directly in Aristotle, I think, but are products of reasoning within the framework of Aristotle's philosophy. Perhaps the one that is most striking is the following artifi cium naturae. 42 Since it was necessary that within the sensitive part of the soul two capacities [vires] could be lodged, one for knowing, one for retaining the images of things, nature did not endow the same faculty, or the same organ, with both. Rather, nature wanted memory not to be endowed with the capacity for knowing, and the latter not to be endowed with that of retaining. Thus the capacity for knowing necessarily knows in actuality those things that it has received. So if fantasy, which is a capacity for knowing, retained the phantasmata, and memory, which is a capacity for retaining, knew the images of things stored in it, then, Zabarella concludes, multiple things could be known at the same time. This is totally impossible according to Zabarella. In the same way, the intellect, which is a capacity for knowing, cannot but know one thing at a time. It does not have a retentive capacity like memory, and therefore species intelligibiles cannot be impressed on it without intellection [intellectio] taking place. In fact intellection is the species itself impressed [species ipsa impressa]. 43 So much for the exegesis, Zabarella style, of Aristotle's position. But there is an intriguing twist.
By interpreting Aristotle as so bluntly separating the natures of active cognition and passive memory, Zabarella faced the question of cognition in the separate state of the soul after life. In the separate state, Zabarella says, it is obvious that the soul cognizes but no longer by receiving species intelligibiles from material objects. Thus, he continues, one has to believe that the soul in the separate state will have perennial memory of things, and therefore that memory cannot be distinguished from cognition. This whole question, however, Zabarella argues, is ultimately a matter for the theologians. 44 We see here the main thrust of Zabarella's Aristotelianism. It is naturalistic in that it tends to defi ne the boundaries of inquiry for the natural philosopher clearly. Zabarella aims at establishing a separate jurisdiction for the natural philosopher.
Example 3. The proof of the eternal motor. At the beginning of the fourth essay,
De inventione aeterni motoris, Zabarella states that he will speak about immaterial substances, i.e., substances separate from matter [substantiae a materia abiunctae], according to the principles of Aristotle's philosophy, and only in so far as they concern the natural philosopher. He will say nothing of what divine revelation tells us about immaterial substances, since divine revelation was unknown to Aristotle, and his [i.e., Zabarella's] goal is to interpret Aristotle's pronouncements.
In De inventione Zabarella tackles the specifi c issue of the proof of the eternal movers, given by Aristotle in Book VIII of the Physics. Zabarella had already discussed the issue in the logical writings, especially in De regressu. There he claimed that in order to discover the eternal movers Aristotle had recourse to regressus, and that this point had been missed by all previous philosophers. 45 The subject of De inventione, however, is not Aristotle's discovery processes, but a host of questions concerning the status of the eternal movers at the crossroads of natural science and metaphysics. The questions are as follows. (1) Whether in order to discover the substances that are separate from matter any means can be used other than motion. (2) Whether separate substances can be proven solely from eternal motion, or also from absolute motion. (3) Whether to demonstrate the eternal movers from eternal motion pertains to the natural philosopher, or to the metaphysician [primus philosophus]. (4) Averroes's opinion that to demonstrate the eternal movers from eternal motion pertains to the natural philosopher only (which is also Zabarella's opinion). (5) The error of some wrongheaded Averroists who believe that the proof's "middle" [medium, i.e., the middle term of a demonstrative syllogism] of the eternal mover belongs to natural science but the conclusion is metaphysical. (6) That a proof has to be named from the "middle", and that Aristotle never believed that a metaphysical conclusion can be proved from a natural or geometrical middle.
The essay aims at proving that Averroes's opinion is correct, and that it is fully consistent with Aristotle's views. Note that in the whole essay the reality of the eternal motion of the heaven, the basis of Aristotle's argument in Book VIII of the Physics (according to Zabarella) , is never called into question. Zabarella takes it for granted. So the issue boils down to proving that the eternal motion of the heaven is the sole admissible, natural basis for the proof of the eternal movers, and that some Averroists err in believing both that a proof may have a natural or geometrical middle and a metaphysical conclusion, and (worse) that this was Aristotle's mind. The intellectual heavy lifting, so to say, comes when Zabarella is out to show that the proof of the eternal movers is wholly natural, and more generally that the opinion that a proof may have a natural or geometrical middle and a metaphysical conclusion is not only wrong, it is monstrous, it is a hermaphrodite. "Quod ego mostrum esse arbitror, et Hermaphroditum a doctrina Aristotelica, et ab Averroe quoque ipso alienissimum", exclaims Zabarella.
46 How does Zabarella proceed, then? First, says Zabarella, it is Aristotle himself in the Posterior analytics, Book I, who denies that such a monstrous demonstration is possible; such a thing would hardly be worthy of the name "demonstration". This monstrous demonstration would in fact amount to a forbidden passage from genus to genus. Geometry, for instance, could not prove that there is one science [scientia] of contraries, which would be a metaphysical conclusion. So much as far as Aristotle is concerned.
Next Zabarella moves on to show that if the demonstration of the eternal movers proved a metaphysical conclusion from a natural middle, then the demonstration would have to be equivalent to the following "illation" [illatio] . In a natural body eternal motion is given therefore substances are given that are separate from matter per essentiam. This, in Zabarella's opinion, is nowhere to be found in Aristotle. No wonder, says Zabarella, since this illation is not effi cacious, because those immaterial substances have no affi nity with motion. In fact what little affi nity they have, they have it qua eternal movers not qua immaterial substances. Between cause and effect there must be an essential nexus; thus the only possible illation is as follows. Eternal motion is given therefore an eternal mover is given. This, Zabarella claims, is doubtless a natural conclusion, since to consider the mover in so far as it is mover is to consider it as a cause of motion, and this pertains to natural science. The metaphysician, on the other hand, knows that separate substances are movers but does not consider them as such. 47 But where did the interpretative error stem from that so many philosophers, in Zabarella's view, have made?
The cause of the error, Zabarella concludes, lies in the fact that all philosophers until his time have failed to recognize the demonstrative regress that Aristotle makes use of in the eighth book of the Physics. In fact, for Zabarella, the confusions of voices clears as soon as one recognizes that the fi rst movement of the regressus process simply leads the natural philosopher to prove the existence of the eternal movers wholly naturally. This of course does not preclude that the metaphysician can take the natural philosopher's conclusion as a given and investigate the conditions of the eternal movers, so as to arrive at knowledge quid sint, i.e., knowledge of what the eternal movers are. As Zabarella points out, we see Aristotle himself repeating the natural demonstration of the eternal movers in his Metaphysics (Book XII), simply because for didactic as well as expository purposes he needs to present it again, not at all because the demonstration is metaphysical and as such belonging to the Metaphysics.
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Example 4. The nature of celestial heat [calor coelestis].
Here we can fi nally observe the professor at the threshold of a withdrawal of allegiance to the Philosopher; in other words, when Zabarella defi nitely shifts from the commentator to the scientist form of allegiance.
That celestial bodies produce heat in the sublunary realm is obvious and, Zabarella says, in need of no proof. The question is how they produce heat according to Zabarella's reconstruction of Aristotle's opinion. Celestial bodies are not igneous, and therefore because of their not being formally hot, but only virtually hot, one has to explain how they produce heat in the sublunary realm. According to Aristotle, celestial bodies warm by motion and by light [lumen] . But Aristotle attributes only to the Sun the power to heat by motion, since the Sun is especially suited for this, being placed at the right distance from us and moving at the right speed. Celestial motion, on the other hand, produces heat because it rarefi es and thins [extenuat] the air underneath. That celestial motion is cause of rarefaction, Zabarella is convinced, can be proved by simple arguments, on which there seems to be little or no disagreement. The hotly debated issue is Aristotle's restricting the power of heating to the Sun, and excluding all of the remaining celestial bodies. This is the sticking point because motion seems to produce heat by attrition in solid bodies, and therefore if celestial motion is to produce heat in the sublunary realm it can do so only by attrition with the outermost layers of the elements. Now, the latter are in contact with the concave of the Moon's orb, not with that of the Sun. So how can the Sun heat things in the sublunary realm? Can it heat the Moon's orb fi rst, so that the latter will transmit heat down below? This, Zabarella claims, is impossible because celestial orbs are not elemental and thus incapable of either heating or cooling. No reason thus seems available to explain this phenomenon. In reviewing the whole discussion up until his time, Zabarella notes that Alexander of Aphrodisias suggested two solutions, but both are ineffective. Simplicius and John Philoponus equally failed. Averroes came closer to the truth of the matter but his solution too is ultimately ineffective. Failing to fi nd a satisfactory interpretation of Aristotle's statements on the cause of celestial heat, he humbles himself proclaiming the modesty [imbecillitas] of his ingenium, and leaving to others the redeeming job of reconciling Aristotle's dictum with the truth of the matter.
Ego igitur, quum aperte fatear me nullam invenire rationem potuisse, qua sententiam Aristotelis tueamur, quod mihi fortasse ob inscitiam meam, atque ingenii imbecillitatem contingit, defensionem Aristotelis aliis excogitandam relinquam….
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Thus since I could fi nd no reason that might support Aristotle's statement, which perhaps is due to my ignorance, and to the modesty of my intelligence, I will leave to others the job of excogitating a defence of Aristotle….
"Sequitur ut quomodo Coelum suo motu calefaciat, consideremus, quando in sententia Aristot. aquiescere minime possumus." 50 It remains that we move on!, Zabarella seems to exclaim to himself, since we cannot agree with Aristotle's opinion.
As for himself, he proceeds to mount a quite original investigation of the cause of celestial heat. However, he hastens to beg the reader not to construe his decision as an attack on Aristotle. 51 Let us give Zabarella his due, and pay heed to his original theory.
There are three conditions that have to be satisfi ed for the orb of the Moon to produce heat underneath. The fi rst is that the moving orb is close enough to the sublunary realm, the second that it is solid, and third that it moves fast enough. As for the Moon's orb the fi rst two conditions seem unexceptionable, and in fact can be found in Aristotle, or so Zabarella claims. The third, however, not so. In fact, to Zabarella's mind, Aristotle believed that the motion of the Moon is not fast enough. But, he insists, the Moon seems to move fast, rotating with the whole celestial sphere once every twenty-four hours. So Aristotle should have proved that this speed is not fast enough. We experience that, for example, when iron hits fl int-stone, setting fi re to the surrounding air. Yet its motion cannot be said to be faster than that of the Moon. By the same token the motion of an arrow through air is not faster than that of the Moon. Yet Aristotle claims that the lead tips of arrows heated by motion melt down. So, in Zabarella's mind, there is no doubt that the motion of the Moon is fast enough to produce heat by attrition. However, the very serious question arises of the terrestrial regions underneath the celestial poles. These regions are known to be cold. Thus either there cannot be fi re but only cold body above these regions, which is absurd because no cold body can occupy the place above the sphere of air, or there is indeed fi re, where there is little or no celestial motion, which is a prime cause of heat. How does then Zabarella square the circle? By postulating with Aristotle that all heat in the elements is maintained by celestial motion, he admits that fi re above the polar regions cannot be maintained, since there is little or no celestial motion close to the poles. Thus fi re is transformed into another, colder element and thus descends by gravity. In fact there is a natural cycle which nature observes. The celestial heat generated especially by celestial light produces vapours which emanate from earth and rise to the sky, where they are transformed into fi re by the attrition caused by celestial motion. So in order to preserve an equilibrium nature had to excogitate a way to allow for a global exchange of matter between elemental spheres. This much, Zabarella claims, seems to have been foreshadowed by Aristotle himself in the fi rst book of the Meteorologica. 52 
CONCLUSION: AN HISTORIOGRAPHIC REFLECTION
Zabarella has come full circle. He has boldly experimented with scientia naturalis ad mentem Aristotelis. He has gone through the cycle of doubting, meditating personal solutions, and risking the failure of reconciliation with the Philosopher. By orchestrating forms of allegiance he has unequivocally (in his view) separated the jurisdiction of the natural philosopher from that of the metaphysician. 53 Let us take stock by starting again from an insight by Pietro Ragnisco. More than a century ago, he acutely posed the question as to whether, in the fi nal analysis, Zabarella really believed in the eternal motion of the heavens. 54 Remember that when "naturalizing" the demonstration of the eternal movers Zabarella had not called into question the eternal motion of the heavens. He had taken it for granted as the starting point of inquiry. So, Ragnisco asks himself, if the circular motion of the heavens can only be eternal motion, why, for Zabarella, does it need an eternal mover in the fi rst place? In other words, Ragnisco argues, Zabarella would have come close to doubting the need for postulating an eternal mover, thus implicitly renouncing a most powerful argument for the existence of separate substances, hence for the existence of God.
We can now tentatively answer Ragnisco's question. In fact I believe that there was no real doubt in Zabarella, at least not in the sense of a deeply felt confl ict of conscience between two possible laws of explanation valid in the heavens and on earth. There is no confl ict in Zabarella between the commentator and the scientist forms of allegiance. Zabarella's conscience has not yet reached the stage of confl ict retention. He still enjoys the privilege of being able to lay down his conscience before authority.
Yet we have to concede that reason looms large in Zabarella's mind. "… fi rst of all, the truth of the matter is to be investigated, and afterwards, once that has become known, Aristotle's words should, if possible, be reconciled with it." Zabarella senses the current of change. He looks out onto modernity, advocating his right to appeal more and more to reason, his personal reason, as a new forum where the individual decides to what extent allegiance to an authority can be pledged. However, the scientifi c practice of the moderns will look like quite another thing; in fact, much more like the "experimentally grounded and mathematically formulated science of nature", seen by Randall in Zabarella and his fellow traditores. Randall's construction of his argument has never been questioned on its own grounds. In the whole of De rebus there are no discernable traces of Zabarella's applying regressus to natural philosophy (though, as we have seen, he puts forward the historical claim that it was regressus that Aristotle had made use of in Book VIII of the Physics). 55 Surely, if regressus was the innovative methodology that paved the way for Galileo and seventeenth-century mathematical physics, some evidence of its successful application to natural philosophy should have been found in its most prominent proponent. Yet there is none.
So, on what basis did Randall construct his argument? And why has regressus been seen as a precursor of modern scientifi c method? I will answer the fi rst question by suggesting that Randall based his argument on a likely mistranslation of a key passage from Galileo. I will subsequently answer the second question by suggesting that regressus has been seen as a precursor of modern scientifi c method because it has been interpreted anachronistically. He thus demonstrates what has never been observed in experience." 56 The original is as follows: "… la cognizione d' un solo effetto acquistata per le sue cause ci apre l' intelletto a 'ntendere ed assicurarci d' altri effetti senza bisogno di ricorrere all' esperienze, come appunto avviene nel presente caso; dove, guadagnata per il discorso dimostrativo la certezza dell' essere il massimo di tutti i tiri di volata quello dell' elevazione dell' angolo semiretto, ci dimostra l' Autore quello che forse per l' esperienza non è stato osservato." 57 I fi nd myself at variance with Randall's rendering of Galileo's passage. Randall translates "effetto" with "fact", introduces a "discovery of …", which is not in the original, and renders the "guadagnata per il discorso dimostrativo ..." with a "by argumentation alone …", where the "discorso dimostrativo" -which Randall considers a type of logical demonstration -refers to the mathematical proof just presented by Salviati-Galileo in the preceding text. Finally, in the last sentence, Randall (or the typist) leaves out the "perhaps [forse]", indispensable to construct the integral meaning of the Italian sentence. Randall's English version is so close to the Crew and de Salvio translation of the Two new sciences passage, that the question arises whether Randall based his analysis on vol. viii of Antonio Favaro's National Edition of Galileo's works (as, I think, we must assume given Randall's referencing the translation precisely to that volume), or he or the typist inadvertently quoted Crew and De Salvio. 58 The anachronistic interpretation of regressus. In my view, Randall and some of his followers have proposed an anachronistic interpretation of Zabarella's regressus theory. By "anachronistic" I simply mean that I fi nd it technically diffi cult to reconcile with the views of Zabarella and his contemporaries. But I need to substantiate my point.
Take the following recent statement about Galileo's alleged use of Zabarella's regressus by William A. Wallace, the major proponent of regressus as a precursor of modern scientifi c method.
The substantial content of MS n. 27 concerns the demonstrative process (regressus), a type of reasoning that makes use of two demonstrations, one of the 'fact in itself', the other of the 'reasoned fact'. In his exposition, Galileo refers to these two demonstrations as 'progressions' and notes that they are separated by an intermediate stage. The fi rst progression argues from the effect to the cause, whereas the second moves in the opposite direction, from cause to effect. In order that the process works, it is necessary that the 'demonstration of the fact' comes fi rst, and that the effect is initially more known than its cause, although at the end they must be seen as convertible. The intermediate stage realizes the transition to the second demonstration. As it was explained in Galileo's times, this stage concerns a mental examination of the proposed cause (mentale ipsius causae examen), according to the expression used by Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1598). The Latin word examen is important because it corresponds to the Greek peîra, a word which is in the root of the Latin periculum, that is, test, the equivalent of experiment (experimentum). The main job of the intermediate stage is the test, to search for and eliminate other possibilities, so as to fi nd the cause the makes that effect be present. 59 Wallace thinks that the intermediate stage of regressus, the mentale ipsius causae examen, is experiment. I will try to show the reason for my perplexity with this interpretation.
First of all, Wallace has recourse to etymological analysis, when claiming that "[i]l termine latino examen è importante perché corrisponde al greco peîra, un vocabolo che è nella radice del latino periculum, cioè prova, l'equivalente di esperimento (experimentum)". He transforms the mental examination [mentale examen] into an experiment, by suggesting that examen corresponds to the Greek peîra, which would be the root of the Latin periculum, and that therefore periculum -equivalent to experiment (according to Wallace) -is what has to be intended instead of examen.
Here I wonder what a mentale ipsius causae periculum, i.e., literally, a mental experiment of a cause, might be. (But, I guess, the notion of mentale periculum would have pleased Alexandre Koyré, who thought that Galileo's experiments were thought-experiments.)
Second of all, I confess that I fi nd the equivalence periculum/experiment postulated by Wallace diffi cult to accept. Periculum seems to mean test, it is almost always to be found in the obscure and idiomatic expression periculum facere (approximately, to do a test, in the sense of verifying if something that is being said is true or not), and does not carry the connotations of experiment in the early modern, Galilean sense of controllable experiment and measurement. Charles Schmitt argued long ago that periculum facere cannot be construed as the carrying out of an experiment. 60 My perplexity with Wallace's interpretation is best illustrated by considering how Paulus Vallius (1561-1622) -the very Jesuit professor whom Wallace believes to be the author, or one of the authors, of the manuscripts from which Galileo culled the notes preserved in MS n. 27 ", by others a "mental examination", by others a "meditation", and by others an "application, and intention of mind". Here we fi nd no terminological clue that the intermediate stage has anything to do with experience. The expression "negotiatio intellectus" is hard to translate. In classical Latin, "negotiatio" only means "business", "commercial transaction", or a "commercial establishment". However, cognates of "negotiatio" in early modern vernaculars, such as, for instance, English, also mean "a discussion or process of treaty with another (or others) aimed at reaching an agreement about a particular issue, problem" (OED). A meaning similar to the latter is also given for the Italian "negoziare" by the Accademia della Crusca dictionary of 1623. 61 Hence my terminological choice, which, as we shall see presently, agrees well, I believe, with how Vallius elucidates the process of regressus. Third, Vallius goes on to explicate the intermediate stage of regressus and to give some examples, none of which refers to periculum or experience.
Vallius argues that by means of this intermediate stage "we see that an effect is always and necessarily connected with the cause, and that to the cause all the conditions of cause apply, and that to the effect all the conditions of effect apply; so, by comparing cause and effect, and by knowing the quiddity of the cause, that cause becomes known to us, and [we know] that the effect depends on that [cause] , and in this way we have cognition of the cause by resolution and application of the logical rules, by means of which we know which is the cause and which is the effect". 62 In sum, according to Vallius, the goal of the intermediate stage of regressus appears to be no more than a clarifi cation of the cause-and-effect relationship, gained by means of logical rules and leading to better knowledge of the quiddity of the cause. There is nothing original in Vallius's treatment of regressus. Around the middle of the sixteenth century, Alessandro Piccolomini (1508-79), a colleague of Zabarella at Padua and the editor of a popular edition of pseudoAristotle's Mechanical questions, and Francesco Barozzi (1537-1604), a mathematician of Greek origin, became involved in a dispute about the nature of mathematical proof. Piccolomini put forward an acute analysis of what constitutes demonstratio potissima, the kind of perfect demonstration that would constitute an Aristotelian demonstrative science. He came to the striking conclusion that mathematical proofs are not potissimae demonstrationes, and that therefore mathematics does not conform to the canon of an Aristotelian demonstrative science. Some, Piccolomini tells us, doubt whether regressus is at all possible in demonstration, by raising the objection that, since in any scientifi c process, the direction is from the unknown to the known, and since by demonstration quia one knows the cause of the effect, it is wholly unclear for what purpose a demonstration propter quid should follow the demonstration quia. Others, Piccolomini continues, in order to defend regressus, admit the existence of an intermediate stage, called "negotiation", between the fi rst demonstration quia and the second demonstration propter quid [i.e., the Zabarellian mentale examen]. 63 But Piccolomini ironically notes that he has always failed to understand what this so-called negotiation is supposed to be, and claims that it is an irrational element that vitiates the whole demonstrative process. "Aliqui … ut coacti ponant quandam (ut ipsi dicunt) negociationem post primum processum, quam ego ponderans nunquam intellexi, quod sibi vellet. Aut enim illa erit, quidam a priori processus, aut a posteriori, et quidquid detur in obscuras ambages inciderimus, ut cuilibet parum in Logica versato, manifestum esse potest." 64 This is the most damming criticism ever levelled at the intermediate stage of regressus theory. The intermediate stage, as Piccolomini points out, introduces an obscure, ultimately illogical element in the logical process ("in obscuras ambages inciderimus"). No regressus theorist has ever been able to respond to Piccolomini's strictures. It is small wonder, then, that even Zabarella de facto abandoned regressus in De rebus.
In conclusion, Zabarella and regressus theory do not deserve credit for foreshadowing Galileo's novel mathematical natural philosophy. On the contrary, as Ragnisco and Schmitt have intuited, Zabarella does deserve credit for separating his practice of natural science, which owes nothing to regressus, from his pledge of allegiance to Aristotle's authority, while working wholly within the Aristotelian framework. One condition of that achievement, which this paper has emphasized, consisted in Zabarella's mobilizing his allegiance to authority, by neutralizing the confl ict of conscience between Zabarella the commentator and Zabarella the scientist.
